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AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS v. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS:
IGNORING CHEVRON AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S
BROAD PURPOSES

. by Bradford C. Mank 1
In 1993, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (hereinafter
"agencies") used their shared authority to protect wetlands under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("Act") to jointly promulgate
the so-called Tulloch rule to regulate the harmful environmental
effects of incidental fallback from dredging operations. 2 In American Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Engineers,3 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that
Congress did not intend that incidental fallback from excavation
or dredging should be considered the discharge of dredge or fill
material into navigable waters under the Act and, accordingly,
that the agencies did not have the authority to require a permit
for this activity.4
Under the principles of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,5 Judge Harris should have deferred to the agencies' interpretation of section 404(a). While
there is little specific support in the Act's text or legislative history for the agencies' interpretation, Judge Harris overstated the
extent to which Congress had indicated that it did not want the
agencies to regulate incidental fallback. As long as a statute is
ambiguous, Chevron requires a court to defer to an agency's
interpretation even if a different interpretation may have somewhat stronger support in the statute or better fit the judge's

1. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. A.B., Harvard,
1983; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987.
2. Army Corps of Engineers & EPA, Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58
Fed. Reg. 45008, 45009-13 (1993) (codified at various C.F.R. sections, including 33
C.F.R. Pts. 323 & 328); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1997).
3. 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997).
4. [d. at 272-78.
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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policy views. s Because section 404(a) is ambiguous regarding the
agencies' authority to regulate incidental fallback material from
dredging and the agencies' interpretation plausibly serves the
Act's broad purposes in protecting wetlands, the district court
erred in striking down the Tulloch rule. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ought to reverse the
district court and reinstate the Tulloch rule.
Part I of this article will provide a brief introduction to section
404 of the Clean Water Act. Part II will examine the Tulloch
rule. Part III will examine the district court's opinion. Finally,
part IV will demonstrate that section 404(a) is ambiguous regarding whether incidental fallback from dredging may in some
circumstances constitute disposal under the statute and, accordingly, that under the Chevron doctrine the district court erred in
failing to defer to the agencies' Tulloch rule.
I. SECTION 404 REQUIRES PERMITS FOR DISCHARGING

DREDGE OR FILL
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 18997 requires
a permit for dredging or filling activities that may obstruct navigation in navigable waters 8 suitable for commercial
transportation, and applies to waters or tidal wetlands located
below mean high water.9 Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act of 1899 defines the Corps' jurisdiction over
excavation activities. 1o
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act).ll Section 404 of the Act seeks to pro-

6. Id. at 842-43.
7. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (1986).
8. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1998) which defines navigable waters as "those waters
that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce."
9. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407; 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1997); Bayou des Familles
Dev. Corp. v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp. 1025, 1034 (E.D. La.
1982); See generally Carol E. Dinkins et aI., Regulatory Obstacles to Development and
Redevelopment: Wetlands and Other Essential Issues, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
ON REAL ESTATE AND OrnER COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, SB18 ALI-ABA 731, 734 (Oct. 10,
1996).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1997) (Stating that the Corps must authorize excavation or
filling of navigable waters).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1997).
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tect wetlands by requiring any person who "discharge[s] dredge
or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites" to obtain a permit from the COrpS.12 The term "pollutant"
encompasses "dredged spoil.,,13 Section 502(12) defines a "discharge" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source.,,14 While the Corps has primary responsibility for issuing permits,15 subject to the EPA's veto authority/6 both agencies have authority to issue binding regulations
and guidance documents to regulate the disposal of dredged materials in waters.17
II. THE TULLOCH RULE

The Corps defines "discharge of dredged material" as the addition of material excavated or dredged from waters of the United
States, including runoff from a dredged material disposal
area. IS From 1972 until 1993, the agencies did not regulate under section 404 incidental fallback or movement from dredging or
excavation of materials from navigable waters, including ·
landclearing, ditching, or channelization, unless the agency could
establish substantial environmental impacts or the relocation of
the dredged materials. 19
In North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch,20 environmental organizations sued the Corps, the EPA and two landowners alleging that landclearing and excavation activities involving
700 acres of wetlands caused significant environmental damage
and, therefore, should be subject to regulation under section
404. 21 In 1992, the agencies settled the case by agreeing to
12. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 404(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a) (1997).
13. Id. § 1362(6).
14. Id. § 1362(12).
15. Id. § 1344(a).
16. Id. § 1344(c).
17. Id. § 1344(b)(1).
18. 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(2), 323.2(c), 323.2(d) (1997); see also Dinkins, supra note 9,
at 735.
19. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41210 (1986); American Mining Congress v. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 269 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Lambert, 589
F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735-36.
20. Civil No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. filed Nov. 30, 1990). The case is noted
in Current Deuelopments, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1681 (Jan. 21, 1994).
21. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45016 (noting the Tulloch case involved excavation
causing extensive destruction of hundreds of acres of wetlands).
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propose a rule regulating the addition or redeposit of dredged
materials, including excavated materials, into wetlands. 22 Mter
providing a sixty-day public comment period, on August 25,
1993, the agencies issued a final rule that essentially incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement. 23
The Tulloch rule redefines the term "discharge of dredged
material" to include small-volume incidental fallback unless the
party conducting the activity can establish that it will not harm
or degrade wetlands or waters of the United States.24 Incidental
fallback includes any soil that is disturbed when a shovel excavates dirt, or any back-spill that falls from a shovel or bucket
and falls back into the same place from which it was removed. 25
Incidental fallback does not include soil moved or deposited away
from the original site. 26 Under section 404, the agencies have
from the beginning regulated so-called "side casting," which involves depositing removed soil alongside a ditch, and careless
disposal practices involving significant discharges into waters.27
The Tulloch rule significantly increased the scope of the
agencies' section 404 jurisdiction because any mechanized
landclearing or dredging activities will result in some incidental
fallback, and, accordingly, the rule brings mechanized
landclearing, ditching, channelization, or other excavation operations within the section 404 permit program. 28 Previously, the
agencies only regulated incidental fallback if it caused substan22. 58 Fed. Reg. 45008 (1993).
23. 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45009·13, 45035-38 (1993) (codified at various C.F.R.
sections, including 33 C.F.R. Pts. 323 & 328).
24. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 4501921 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade," 45035-38); see also American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735.
25. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii)
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45009-13 (1993); see also American Mining
Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.4.
26. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii)
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45009-13 (1993); see also American Mining
.
Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.4.
27. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii)
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45014 (1993); see also American Mining
Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.4; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 736.
28. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R.
§ 232.2(1)(iii) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45017-19 (1993) (describing
mechanized iandclearing, ditching, channelization and other excavation activities); see
also American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3.
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tial environmental impacts, and the presumption was against
regulation of incidental fallback even if large discharges were
involved, unless the agencies could establish environmental effects. 29 The Tulloch rule creates a rebuttable presumption that
shifts the burden to the regulated party to demonstrate, before
beginning a project, that the federal government does not have
jurisdiction over the activity.30 To rebut this presumption, the
regulated party must show that the activity will have de minimis
environmental impacts and not harm or degrade wetlands or
waters of the United States. 31 The agencies announced in the
Tulloch rule that they would apply a very low threshold for what
constitutes an environmental effect and, accordingly, there is a
significant burden on regulated parties to show that their activities will cause no harm. 32 In determining what constitutes an
environmental impact that may harm or degrade waters of the
United States, the agencies not only examine the direct environmental impacts of the incidental fallback, but also claim the
authority to regulate indirect or secondary environmental effects
associated with dredging, mechanized landclearing, ditching,
channelization or excavation activities as long as there is a discharge of dredged or fill material, including incidental
fallback. 33
Because a discharge to navigable waters of the United States
is "an absolute prerequisite" to the exercise of government authority under section 404, the Tulloch rule does not apply to
mere removal activities. 34 Furthermore, the rule excludes de
minimis soil movement incidental to any activity that does not or

29. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii)
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45009-13, 45035-38 (1993); see also American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3.
30. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(c)(2), 323.2(d)(3)(i) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R.
§§ 232.2(2), 232.2(3)(i) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45021-22 (1993)
(creating presumption that dredging and excavation activities destroy or degrade); see
also American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3.
31. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 4501922, 45035-38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis" and creating
presumption that dredging and excavation activities destroy or degrade); American
Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735.
32. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45020-21' (1993).
33. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011-13 (1993); see supra note 28 and accompanying .
text.
34. 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011 (1993).
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would not have the effect of destroying or degrading wetlands or
waters, which means that the activity alters an area so it would
no longer be a water of the United States. 35 Conveniently, the
agencies exempted incidental movement of dredged material'
resulting from dredging designed to improve navigation in navigable waters, an exemption that applies as a practical matter
only to the Corps.36
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
A. The Parties' Arguments

The American Mining Congress and other development interests filed suit challenging the Tulloch rule as exceeding the
agencies' authority under section 404 of the Act because Congress never intended for incidental fallback to be within the
statute's jurisdiction. 37 They contended that the Tulloch rule
used the concept of "incidental fallback" as a justification for
expanding the agencies' jurisdiction to regulate excavating and
landclearing activities that are not otherwise within the scope of
the section 404 permit program. 3S
By contrast, the agencies maintained that they were authorized to regulate incidental fallback, and that Chevron required
the district court to defer to their expertise in interpreting the
Act. 39 They argued that incidental fallback was always regulated by them, but that they had created a narrow exception from
the permit requirement for de minimis discharges. 4o The agencies contended that the Tulloch rule merely closes a loophole in
the Act by tightening a de minimis exception within their discre35. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(e)(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at
45019·21, 45026, 45035·38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and excluding
incidental soil movement during "normal" dredging operations); see also American
Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735.
36. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 n.3; 58 Fed. Reg. at
45009-13, 45035-38 (1993).
37. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 268-71.
38. See id. at 271.
39. [d.

40. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 4501921, 45035-38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis"); see also
American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at
735.
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tion, and that the rule effectuates the statute's goals in protecting wetlands from degradation. 41

B. The District Court's Decision
1.

Incidental Fallback Is Not the "Addition of a Pollutant."

The district court concluded that incidental fallback is not the
"addition of a pollutant" to navigable waters and, therefore, does
not constitute a "discharge" within the agencies'section 404(a)
authority.42 Because section 404(a) only authorizes the agencies
to regulate "discharge[s]" of "dredge or fill material,"43 it is crucial to determine whether incidental fallback constitutes a discharge.
The American Mining Congress and other plaintiffs argued
that by defining a "discharge" to require the "addition" of a "pollutant," Congress intended to regulate only the introduction or
placement of dredged material into water, and not the incidental
fallback that accompanies the removal of material from navigable waters.44 Instead, section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 defines the Corps' jurisdiction over excavation activities. 45
The defendant agencies argued that the term "addition of
pollutants" is ambiguous and that the district court should defer
to its interpretation under the Chevron doctrine. 46 While the
district court properly concluded that Congress did not want the
agencies to regulate de minimis amounts of incidental fallback,
the court should have given the agencies more latitude in determining when incidental fallback may constitute an "addition of

41. Compare 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations) and 40
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(4) (1998) (EPA regulations) and 58 Fed. Reg. at 4501921, 45035-38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis" very broadly
to protect the environment from effects of dredging and excavation activities) with
American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 271 (criticizing the agencies' broad definition of degradation and the agencies' rule placing the burden on the regulated party
to prove its activities are de minimis).
42. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272-78.
43. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 404(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1997).
44. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272.
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1997) (Corps must authorize excavation or filling of
navigable waters).
46. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272.
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pollutants" and "discharge" under the Act.

a. Under section 404(a), excavation or dredging activities do not
constitute a "discharge."
The district court correctly concluded that under section 404(a)
excavation or dredging activities do not constitute a "discharge,"
but erroneously inferred as a result that incidental fallback may
never constitute an "addition of pollutant" and "discharge." Because section 10 of the Rivers and Appropriations Act of 1899
explicitly defines the Corps' jurisdiction over excavation activities 47 and section 404 does not expressly refer to such matters,
the district court argued that Congress intended to regulate
removal activities only under the former statute and the disposal
of material only under the latter.48 Even if section 404(a)'s jurisdiction does not reach removal activities, that does not resolve
whether incidental fallback constitutes an "addition of pollutant"
or "discharge" under the Act.

b. Under the Act, the term "discharge" does not include
incidental fallback.
While acknowledging that neither the Act's 1972 or 1977 legislative history specifically refers to "incidental fallback," the district court argued that Congress had a very definite view regarding the meaning of the term "discharge" under section 404(a) and
that its intent was that incidental fallback does not constitute
disposal under the statute. 49 According to the district court,
Congress intended the term "discharge of dredged material to
mean open water disposal of material removed during the digging or deepening of navigable waterways," and that this purpose "excludes the small-volume incidental discharge that accompanies excavation and landclearing activities."50 In 1977, Senator Muskie, a leading force in writing the Act, stated that the
statute was not intended to regulate "de minimis" activities. 51
47. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1997) (Corps must authorize excavation or filling of
navigable waters).
48. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272-73.
49. [d. at 273-74.
50. [d. at 273.
51. [d. (quoting Senate Report on section 1952, 95th Cong., reprinted in 1977
Legis. Hist. at 645).

HeinOnline -- 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 58 1997-1998

1997]

AMC v. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

59

Furthermore, in 1977, Senator Domenici indicated that Congress
did not intend the Act to regulate someone who merely "mov[es]
a little bit of earth .... "52 Because landclearing or dredging
activities routinely result in some incidental fallback, the district
court maintained that the remarks of Senators Muskie and
Domenici suggest that Congress did not intend the statute to
reach such small and routine movements of soil as disposal activities. 53 Neither Senator Muskie nor Domenici's statements,
however, clearly address whether the agencies may regulate
incidental fallback that causes environmental degradation.
The district court also argued that Congress intended that the
term "disposal" refers to the movement of dredged material from
one place to another, and that incidental fallback is not an "addition" of soil because "some material simply falls back in the same
general location from which most of it was removed.,,54 In support, the district court quoted Senator Ellender's statement during the 1972 debates on the Act: "The disposal of dredged material does not involve the introduction of new pollutants; it merely
moves the material from one location to another.,,55 Senator
Ellender's remarks, however, could be interpreted to provide an
even narrower definition of disposal than the district court's,
that dredge material is never the addition of a pollutant, but
merely involves moving it from one place to another. Because
Senator Ellender did not specifically address the issue of incidental fallback and his statement represents only his views rather
than that of an entire committee or the Senate as a whole, his
remarks cannot be considered conclusive.
c. Congress implicitly ratified the agencies' earlier interpretation

that excluded incidental fallback from section 404.
The district court also contended that Congress implicitly
ratified "through its lack of amendment" the agencies' and
courts' earlier interpretation that excluded incidental fallback

52. [d. at 273 (quoting Senate Report on section 1952, 95th Cong., reprinted in
1977 Legis. Hist. at 924).
53. [d. at 273.
54. [d. at 273-74.
55. See id. at 273 (quoting Senate Debate on section 2770, reprinted in 1972
Legis. Hist. at 1386).
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from section 404. 56 The failure of Congress to amend a statute,
however, is of only very limited value in determining the intent
of the original enacting Congress in 1972. Furthermore, the
failure of Congress to amend a statute can result from a number·
of causes other than agreement with an agencies' interpretation,
including internal congressional divisions or lack of interest. 57
Because congressional inaction may stem from many different
reasons, courts only apply the principle of de facto ratification in
those rare cases where there is clear evidence that Congress
knew about an agency interpretation and relied on that interpretation as a primary reason not to take legislative action. There
is no clear evidence that Congress explicitly relied on the
agencies' pre-Tulloch interpretation of section 404. 58 The court's
related argument that Congress implicitly ratified the agencies'
prior interpretation that dredging and incidental fallback are not
disposal activities because Congress amended other subsections
of 404 several times without disturbing the prior interpretation
of subsection 404(a) regarding incidental fallback, 59 suffers from
the same flaw. There is no evidence cited by the plaintiffs or the
district court that Congress explicitly considered the incidental
fallback issue or extensively debated it when it periodically
amended the Act.
Similarly, the fact that there have been several proposals in
recent years to expand the scope of section 404 and that Congress has not enacted any of them 60 does not prove the intent of
the 1972 statute. Legislative failure often results from complex
causes involving the building of coalitions, legislative inertia,
overlapping environmental jurisdiction among committees, especially in the House of Representatives, and lobbying by interest
groupS.61 Furthermore, members of Congress who sought to
56. Id. at 274·75.
57. See National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 695·96 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (observing that there are many causes for congressional inaction), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); see generally Bradford C. Mank, The EPA's Regulatory
Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Action, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 1998)
(addressing reasons for congressional gridlock and fragmentation in addressing envi·
ronmental legislation).
58. See National Petroleum Refiners, 482 F.2d at 695·97.
59. See Public Citizen v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Congress is
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation when it re·en·
acts a statute without change.") (citation omitted).
60. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 276.
61. See National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 695·96 (D.C.

HeinOnline -- 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 60 1997-1998

1997]

AMC v. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

61

broaden section 404 may have been attempting to clarify what
they consider an ambiguous statute or to avoid litigation rather
than repealing a restrictive statute that clearly did not allow the
agencies to regulate incidental fallback from excavation. 62 Analogously, the fact that a White House press release announcing
the Tulloch rule stated that Congress should amend the .Act63
does not prove that the Act clearly forbids that rule's interpretation, but it may merely suggest that section 404 is ambiguous
regarding whether incidental fallback may be regulated or that
officials were seeking to avoid potentially lengthy litigation. The
district court drew far too many inferences from mere legislative
inaction or proposals when there were many other interpretations, including the possibility that leaders in Congress or the
White House thought that section 404 was ambiguous regarding
the regulation of incidental fallback.

2. Excavation Sites Are Not "Specified Disposal Sites"
According to the district court, "Even if the term 'addition of a
pollutant' were broad enough to cover incidental fallback, the
court would still hold that the Tulloch rule departs from
Congress' intent that the material must be discharged at a 'specified disposal site'."64 The court argued that the language "specified disposal site" indicated that the "site must have been affirmatively selected as a disposal site by the agencies," and "also
conveys Congress' understanding that 'discharges' would result
in the relocation of material from one site to another."65 The
court contended, "The Tulloch rule makes the term 'specified
disposal site' superfluous; under the rule, all excavation sites are
considered 'specified disposal sites'."ss As a result, according to
Judge Harris, the Tulloch rule misreads the statute by treating

Cir. 1973) (observing that there are many causes for congressional inaction), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); see generally Mank, supra note 57.
62. See National Petroleum Refiners, 482 F.2d at 696 (observing that Congress
may amend a statute "out of uncertainty, understandable caution, and a desire to
avoid litigation").
63. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 276 & n.20 (citing White
House Office on Environmental Policy, Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair, Flexible, and Effective Approach 23 (Aug. 24, ·1993».
64. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 278.
65. [d.

66. [d.
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excavation sites as disposal sites when the plain language of the
statute means that "specified disposal sites" are "the place[s]
where the dredged material is disposed of' rather than where it
is excavated. 67 In addition, the court invoked the statutory canon noscitur a sociis,68 to maintain that its interpretation of "disposal" as referring to the movement of soil was reinforced by
Congress' use of the term "specified disposal sites" in section
404(a)9. 69

IV. UNDER CHEVRON, THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD
HAVE DEFERRED TO THE TULLOCH RULE

A. The Chevron Doctrine

Under Chevron, a court first examines "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.,,70 If a statute is ambiguous or contains a gap, however, the court in the second level of analysis
must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is "permissible," or
in other words, if it is reasonable.71 If a statute contains a "gap"
or is ambiguous, the Chevron doctrine creates a presumption
that Congress implicitly delegated the resolution of this issue to
the agencies. 72
67. Id.
68. "It is known from its associates." Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the
meaning of an uncertain or questionable word is gathered from the words surrounding it. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (resolving
statutory question with noscitur a sociis); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 702 (1995) (diSCUSSing application of the
doctrine to a regulation promulgated under the Endangered Species Act).
69. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 273-74.
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
71. See id. at 840, 843-45; Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is
Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WABH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1996); Kenneth
W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986).
72. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (finding that Congress sometimes implicitly
delegates to the agency the authority to fill in the gaps in the statute); Mank, supra
note 71, at 1244 (explaining that "Chevron appeared to presume that whenever Congress delegated authority to administer a statute, it also delegated authority to the
agency to fill in any gaps present in the statute, rather than leaving that role to the
judiciary"); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
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Chevron does not require judicial acquiescence to all agency
interpretations. A court makes an independent judgment in
deciding whether the statute has directly spoken to a question,
and does not defer to the agency in de.termining whether the
legislation ·is ambiguous. 73 In making its independent assessment of a statute's meaning and congressional intent, a court
may "employO traditional tools of statutory construction,"74 and
may examine particular statutory language, the language and
structure of the statute as a whole, and, where appropriate,
legislative history. 75
Nevertheless, the Chevron principle does not require an
agency's interpretation to be the most likely or popular, but
merely a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 76
Indeed, Justice Scalia has argued that "Chevron becomes virtually meaningless, it seems to me, if ambiguity exists only when the
arguments for and against various interpretations are in absolute equipose,"77 and that judges must defer to an agency interpretation "when two or more reasonable, though not equally
valid, interpretations exist."78 Judge Harris failed to recognize
that the agencies' interpretation that incidental fallback can be a
form of disposal under section 404 was a plausible interpretation
of an ambiguous statutory provision, even if his own interp~eta
tion may be a better reading of the Act.
B. The District Court's Argument for Not Following Chevron

The district court rebuffed all of the agencies' arguments about
the importance of deferring to agency expertise under the Chevron doctrine because the court was firmly convinced that Congress did not intend for the agencies to regulate under section

L.J. 969, 979 (1992) (stating that "Chevron in effect adopted a fiction that assimilated all cases involving statutory ambiguities or gaps into the express delegation or
'legislative rule' model"); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17 (suggesting that Chevron presumes that
ambiguities entail delegation of interpretative power).
73. See Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
75. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 919 F.2d
158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
76. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
77. See Scalia, supra note 70, at 520.
78. Scalia, supra note 70, at 521.
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404 either dredging or the incidental fallback that inevitably
accompanies such operations, but intended that provision to
govern only the disposal of dredged material in another location. 79 The district court cited both prior agency pronouncements and caselaw to demonstrate that both excavation activi.ties and incidental fallback from such operations were beyond
the scope of the statute. so According to the district court, only
one prior case had considered incidental fallback to be a regulated discharge, Reid v. Marsh,s1 a 1984 decision by a federal
district court in Northern Ohio. The Reid court, however, held
that the Corps was limited to considering the effects of the discharge itself, and that the Corps could not address the overall
effects of the entire dredging activity.s2 Because incidental
fallback is a normal byproduct of dredging and Congress did not
intend to r~gulate removal activities under section 404, the dis-.
trict court concluded that Congress could not have intended to
regulate incidental fallback pursuant to that statutory provision. s3
In addition, Judge Harris argued that dredging or removal
activities are outside the Act's jurisdiction because such operations are exclusively within the domain of section 10 of the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act.s4 Even the Reid court
acknowledged that dredging in itself is regulated by section 10,
and is not within the scope of section 404 unless there is a discharge of fill or dredged material that causes direct environmental effects.s5 While the act of dredging or excavation in itself is
probably exclusively within the reach of the 1899 statute, however, that does not directly answer whether incidental fallback
79. American Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 274
(D.D.C. 1997).
80. Id. (citing Salt Pond Assocs. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 815 F.
Supp. 766, 778, 782 (D. Del. 1993); United States v. Lambert, 18 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1294, affd, 695 F.2d 535 (11th Cir. 1983); 51 Fed. Reg. at 41210.
81. Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that even de minimis incidental fallback from dredging activities may constitute
disposal under section 404 of the Clean Water Act).
82. See id.; 58 Fed. Reg. at 45012 (arguing Reid improperly limited Corps jurisdiction to environmental effects of discharge and that Corps actually has authority to
regulate indirect effects associated with dredging).
83. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 274-75.
84. See id. at 272-73; 33 U.S.C. § 403 (Corps must authorize excavation or filling
of navigable waters).
85. See Reid, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1342.
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from such activities is outside section 404. In addition, the agencies also claimed the authority to regulate indirect or secondary
environmental degradation associated with dredging, mechanized
landclearing, ditching, channelization or excavation activities as
long as there is a discharge of dredged or fill material, including
incidental fallback. 86
Furthermore, the district court contended that the Tulloch
rule impermissibly focuses on the "environmental effects of
Uandclearing or excavation] activit[ies] resulting in the discharge, rather than on the discharge itself.,,87 The district court·
is absolutely correct that a discharge is a prerequisite for section
404 jurisdiction and that the agencies simply do not have the
authority under the Act to regulate environmental impacts in the
absence of a discharge but, again, this point does not resolve
whether incidental fallback can ever be a form of discharge. 88
The court also argued that the agencies' reinterpretation was
entitled to less weight because of its inconsistency with their
prior interpretations. 89 The court acknowledged that "[a]gencies
are, of course, permitted to revise their interpretations" of an
ambiguous statute, but maintained that the statute was not
ambiguous. 9o The agencies had contended that their increased
experience with the harmful environmental effects of excavation
and landclearing activities provided a "reasoned analysis for the
change.,,91 The district court rejected this argument, however,
because "it is not apparent to the Court how this experience
would alter the agencies' interpretation of congressional intent."92

86. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011-13; see also supra part lILA.

87. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 275 n.18.
88. [d.
89. [d. at 274 n.13 (citing Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-

Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)).
90. [d. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-88 (1991».
91. Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (holding that agency may change policy if it provides reasoned analysis for
change); see 58 Fed. Reg. at 45015 (stating agencies' belief that change in agency
policy in Tulloch rule "is warranted in light of our increased understanding of the
severe environmental effects often associated with the activities covered by the rule"
and is based on "reasoned analysis"); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (observing that change in agency
policy must be based on "reasoned analysis").
92. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 274 n.13. _
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C. Why Chevron Is Applicable
Section 404 is ambiguous regarding whether incidental
fallback from dredging, landclearing or excavation operations
constitutes "disposal" under section 404, and, accordingly, the
district court erred in failing to defer to the agencies' plausible
interpretation of the Act. While the available legislative history
suggests that Congress in 1972 or 1977 did not intend to regulate de minimis incidental fallback from dredging or excavation
activities that do not cause environmental degradation,93 Congress did not clearly address the possibility that incidental
fallback might be significant in volume or environmental effects.
Accordingly, there is an ambiguity or gap in the statute regarding whether the agencies may regulate incidental fallback that
causes environmental degradation. Because Congress did not
specifically address whether incidental fallback is a form of "disposal" or the "addition of a pollutant," the Chevron doctrine creates a presumption that Congress implicitly delegated the resolution of this issue to the agencies. 94
Even if the agencies' interpretation is not the most likely one,
the Tulloch ~ule is a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. While the agencies in 1986 and many prior judicial decisions had rejected that interpretation,95 the Reid decision in
1984 had read the term "discharge" to include the direct environmental impacts of even de minimis incidental fallback. 96 In addition, the agencies have plausibly suggested that Congress did
not address whether the agencies should have the authority to
regulate indirect or secondary environmental degradation associated with dredging, mechanized 1andclearing, ditching, channelization or excavation activities as long as there is a discharge of
dredged or fill material, including incidental fallback and, accordingly, have suggested that their interpretation to include
such secondary effects is entitled to deference under the Chevron
doctrine. 97 Because section 404 is ambiguous regarding whether
incidental fallback causing environmental degradation consti93. See supra Part III.B.!.
94. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843·44 (1984).
95. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 275 n.17.
96. Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
97. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011·13.
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tutes the "addition of a pollutant" and "disposal," then, contrary
to the district court's assertion, the agencies' experience that
incidental fallback has important environmental effects constitutes reasonable grounds for changing their interpretation of the
statute and issuing the Tulloch rule. 98
Furthermore, the Tulloch rule serves the Act's broad purposes,
which are to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters.,,99 While the district
court properly observed that such broad purposes are relevant
only if a statute is ambigUous and does not demonstrate that
Congress intended to delegate "unrestricted authority" to an
agency/oo the Supreme Court has sometimes given an agency
the benefit of the doubt in deciding whether a complex regulatory statute is ambiguous if its interpretation advances a statute's
broad purposes. lOl
While the district court is probably right that a distinction
ought to be made between an excavation site and a "specified
disposal site," the court again fails to consider the possibility
that the statute is ambiguous when incidental fallback causes
environmental degradation at the excavation site. If that is so,
then the Tulloch rule appropriately recognizes that excavation
sites also can be, under some circumstances, disposal sites as
well.

98. Compare Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 690
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing that agency experience is grounds for altering its interpretation of a statute) and 58 Fed. Reg. at 45015 (stating agencies' belief that
change in agency policy in Tulloch rule "is warranted in light of our increased understanding of the severe environmental effects often' associated with the activities
covered by the rule" and is based on "reasoned analysis") with American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 274 n.13 (arguing that agency experience is irrelevant if·
statute's original intent contradicts agency interpretation).
99. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
100. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 277.
101. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 703-08 (1995) (invoking Chevron deference principle and statute's broad
purposes as grounds for deferring to Secretary of Interior's interpretation of term
"harm" in Endangered Species Act); Mank, supra note 71, at 1265, 1278-90 (arguing
that courts should give considerable deference to agency interpretations of complex
regulatory statutes).
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V. CONCLUSION
While Chevron was supposed to increase judicial deference to
agency interpretations, some empirical evidence suggests that
courts are no more, or even less, likely to defer to such interpretations than before the Supreme Court unanimously decided that
case. l02 Courts too frequently are unwilling to defer to an agency interpretation that a judge believes is less plausible than her
own explication of statutory meaning. l03 There are significant
costs when a court fails in appropriate circumstances to defer to
an agency's interpretation because: (1) agencies are closer to the
political branches than courts, and hence more likely to provide
an interpretation consistent with popular values; (2) agencies
normally possess greater scientific and technical expertise than
courts; (3) agencies can provide greater flexibility by changing a
statutory interpretation when experience demonstrates the need
for a change; and (4) agencies can provide greater uniformity
than lower courts by providing a consistent interpretation that
does not vary from circuit to circuit. l04 For all these reasons,
agencies are often more capable of interpreting complex "intransitive" regulatory statutes that have no clear meaning than

102. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 103 (1994) (concluding that affirmance rates in federal
appellate courts dropped from mid-70% range in 1983-1987 to mid-60% range in
1988-1990); Mank, supra note 71, at 1245-47 (citing sources); Merrill, supra note 72,
at 982 (explaining that during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Supreme Court applied Chevron in only one-third of applicable cases); Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Inpitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750-52, 762-63 & passim (1995) (explaining that during 1990-1994, the Supreme Court frequently invoked the "plain meaning" principle to avoid invoking Chevron deference); Peter H. Shuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law,
1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1038 (finding that although Chevron initially increased 'deference
by federal appellate courts, most of this effect had weakened by 1988).
103. See generally Mank, supra note 71, at 1278-92 (arguing that textualist judges
frequently ignore the spirit of Chevron by arguing that statute's text has a plain
meaning); Pierce, supra note 102, at 750-52.
104. See generally Mank, supra note 71, at 1278-90 (arguing that agencies provide
greater political sensitivity, expertise and flexibility than courts); Peter Strauss, One
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987) (contending that judicial deference to agency interpretations enhances regulatory uniformity because the Supreme Court can review so few cases, and, therefore, agency
interpretations provide more uniformity than potentially conflicting lower court decisions).
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generalist Article III judges. 105
Judge Harris makes a number of reasonable arguments in
contending that Congress did not intend section 404 to regulate
dredging activities or the inevitable incidental fallback from such
operations. He failed to demonstrate, however, that Congress in
1972, 1977 or any time since, specifically addressed the issue of
incidental fallback. Accordingly, there is a gap, silence or ambiguity in what Congress' intent was regarding this issue and
Chevron compels judicial deference to the agencies' plausible
interpretation of the statute.
In addition, Judge Harris' decision would undermine the broad
purposes of the Act by preventing the agencies from regulating
incidental fallback that causes environmental degradation. The
Tulloch rule appropriately exempted incidental fallback that had
only de minimis environmental impact, although it placed a
significant burden on regulated parties to demonstrate that their
activities would not cause environmental degradation. lOS While
reasonable people might disagree with whether the burden
should be on the agencies or on the regulated to establish that
their dredging operations will cause only de minimis effects,
courts should defer to the agencies' experience regarding where
to place that burden. 107
Judge Harris would have required the agencies to rescind the
Tulloch rule on a nationwide basis. lOS Fortunately, the Court of
Appeals has stayed Judge Harris' decision pending the outcome

105. See Mank, supra note 71, at 1280-81; see also Edward L. Rubin, Modern
Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber
and Ross, 45 V AND. L. REV. 579, 580-87 (1992) (explaining that most federal statutes
are addressed to specialized audiences).
106. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(4) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R.
§§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(4) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45019-21, 45035-3!! (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis"); American Mining Congress v. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 270 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1997); Dinkins, supra note 9,
at 735.
107. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45015 (stating agencies' belief that change in agency
policy in Tulloch rule "is warranted in light of our increased understanding of the
severe environmental effects often associated with the activities covered by the rule"
and is based on "reasoned analysis"); Fed. Reg. at 45021-22 (creating a presumption
that dredging and excavation activities destroy or degrade).
108. American Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 962 F. Supp. 2 (D.D.C.
1997). On defendants' motion to alter or amend judgment, the District Court, Judge
Stanley Harris, held that injunctive relief would not be restricted to plaintiffs, but
would apply nationwide. [d.
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of the agencies' appeal. 109 Following Chevron, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should reverse the
district court and reinstate the Tulloch rule.

109. See Wetlands: Corps Again to Require Excavation Permits as Appeals Court
Stays Lower Court Ruling, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 596 (1997) (reporting that court of
appeals stayed Judge Harris' injunction pending appeal).
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